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Abstract
In this research, we attempt to shed light on the question of where corruption risks in the governance of renewable
resources are located and how they have been addressed in European countries that have different levels of corruption.
A comparative case study design was chosen, looking into the fisheries sector in Iceland and the forestry sector in Romania.
We conducted 25 semi-structured interviews with various stakeholders sampled through a snowball method. Qualitative
coding and systems analysis were used to analyse the interviews. The results indicate that comprehensive and ambitious
legislation does not necessarily translate into successful resource governance systems. In general, the institutions that
were put in place to enforce and monitor the legal codes and regulations did not have the capacity to carry out their
role. Additionally, interviewees were generally found to have a widespread perception of there being a corrupt relation-
ship between politics and big companies operating in their sectors. Our findings suggest that when people hold such
perceptions, it undermines anti-corruption policy efforts in the resource sectors, which can then impede sustainable re-
source management.
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1. Introduction
Environmental issues are higher on the public agenda in
light of growing awareness of climate change and there-
fore further efforts are needed to understand how re-
sources can be used sustainably. The tragedy of the com-
mons has beenwidely cited as ametaphor to portray the
overuse of a renewable resource such as fisheries and
forests (Ostrom, 1999). Rules and systems have there-
fore been established to regulate use or extraction, but
corruption can impede the achievement of management
goals. Resource management systems are vulnerable to
different forms of corruption at all stages of the value
chain, but understanding the roles and influences of ac-
tors in such systems provides important insights into how
to address the risks (Kolstad, Søreide, & Williams, 2008).
We adhere to the interpretation of corruption used by
Sumaila, Jacquet, andWitter (2017, p. 93) in this context,
where they describe it as “acts of ‘cheating,’ whereby in-
dividuals or larger entities act in an illegalmanner”which
serves to undermine both the resource itself aswell as its
management. Heywood (2016) suggests that one of the
reasons measures to reduce corruption have not been
effective, is that disaggregation of the different types of
the phenomenon, actors involved and sectoral context
has been insufficiently addressed.
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Mapping out the corruption risks in the governance
of renewable natural resources, such as fisheries and
forestry, as well as exploring the policies aimed to re-
duce them, is both relevant and important in the cur-
rent global sustainability context. Such work should not
solely be directed towards developing countries, espe-
cially since according to the Group of States Against
Corruption (GRECO, 2017, p. 20), “weaker democracies
look to Europe for guidance in their fight against corrup-
tion.” Therefore, a comparative qualitative case study de-
sign was chosen to shed light on the research question
of ‘What generates corruption risks in the value chain
of renewable resources in Europe, and how has it been
addressed?’ We aim to improve the understanding of
responses to potential risks and how they play out in
countries with different levels of corruption. Improving
understanding of both the risks and the policies meant
to tackle them provide insights into the barriers to sus-
tainable resource management. The small sample that
was subject to this study limits the generalization of the
findings, which could be strengthened if applied to fur-
ther cases.
2. Methods and Research Material
We limit the scope of the research by opting for a case-
oriented investigation (Ragin, 1987) and thus explore
the phenomenon within a real-life context by employ-
ing an exploratory case study strategy (Robson, 1993;
Yin, 2014). Empirical analysis was undertaken as a binary
comparison between two selected cases, Iceland and
Romania (Tarrow, 2010). The aim is for the understanding
and knowledge generated from the cases to shed light on
the phenomenon in general, making this an instrumental
inquiry (Stake, 1995).
The rationale behind the case study selection was to
explore the initial assumption that countries recorded
as having low corruption levels were more successful in
addressing corruption risks in their value chains as op-
posed to those recorded as having high corruption levels.
According to the Corruption Perceptions Index, the lower
a country is ranked on the list, the greater the percep-
tion that corruption is prevalent. Romania has historically
been ranked amongst the bottom of the European coun-
tries while Iceland has been amongst the top. In 2019,
Romania was ranked 70th and Iceland 11th out of 180
countries on the list (Transparency International, 2019).
The cases were considered feasible as the researchers
already had background knowledge and connections in
the countries which served to ensure both accessibility
to participants as well as limiting the resources needed
to carry out the fieldwork.
As the focus of the study was to explore responses to
corruption risks in natural resource management in gen-
eral, as well as how they played out in different sectors,
a decision was taken not to look at the same resource
for both countries. Although they have different resource
bases, forestry in Romania and fisheries in Iceland have
both played an important role for each country in terms
of social and economic development (Ioras & Abrudan,
2006; Kokorsch & Benediktsson, 2018). The de facto pri-
vatization of the Icelandic fisheries and the repossession
of forests in Romania following the collapse of the com-
munist regime, both occurring in the 1990s, has meant
the sectors have been faced with a variety of challenges.
Even though the sectors are different, they share com-
monalities in that external governmental agencies are
legally responsible for enforcement of the law. The re-
search question could, therefore, be explored by compar-
ing these two cases.
An application for the researchwas approved in 2017
by the Research Ethics Committee of the University of
Iceland. Following that, a stakeholder map was devel-
oped for each case study (Reed et al., 2009; Durham,
Baker, Smith, Moore, & Morgan, 2014), and key infor-
mants recruited as a result. They were asked to provide a
list of possible participants for the research, according to
a snowball sampling method (Robson, 1993), to ensure
anonymity. In-depth semi-structured interviews took
place from March to October 2018. As seen in Table 1,
25 interviews were conducted; 12 in Iceland and 13 in
Romania. The interviews were conducted in Icelandic,
English, and Romanian, with a translator present in
Romania; they lasted approximately an hour, with a few
exceptions ranging from 40 minutes to 2,5 hours. To en-
sure a representative sample, 12 of the interviews were
taken in the capitals, while 13 were conducted in rural
areas or smaller cities.
As can be seen in Table 1, the number of participants
exceeds the number of interviews in the Romanian case.
That is because a participant showed up to the interview
with colleagues. When the numbers in the stakeholder
groups are added up, they are larger than the number of
participants since it was common that people had served
multiple roles in the sector and could, therefore, be cat-
egorized in more than one group. Notice that we also
refer to ‘current/former’ role in order to better ensure
anonymity. In terms of the age of the participants, each
age group is represented. There is, however, an imbal-
ance between female and male participants. We failed
to recruit a current/former member of government as
well as high-level representative from large companies
operating within the sectors. The sample is considered
large enough to gain a general understanding of the phe-
nomenon under study, even though limitations in the
stakeholder sample are present, especially in terms of
gender diversity.
The qualitative coding procedure used to analyse the
interviews was adapted from the work of Turner, Kim,
and Andersen (2013). Causal loop diagrams were gen-
erated based on mechanisms described by the intervie-
wees. Thismethod allows us to compare and contrast the
dynamics that contribute to the corruption risks in both
cases and is further described below.
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Table 1. Overview of the interviewees by stakeholder categorization, country, gender, and age.
Stakeholder Iceland Romania
NGO staff 0 4
Current/former resource owner/recipient 2 2
Current/former Member of Parliament 2 1
Current/former journalist 1 1
Current/former parliamentary staff 1 1
Academia 3 3
Current/former public official 4 3
Current/former member of government 0 0
Resource owner associations/organization 2 1
Harvesting operations/exploitation of resource 5 4
Small business owner 1 1
Big industry worker 2 1
Owner or manager of a big corporation 0 0
Current/former local politician 1 0
Finance sector 1 0
Total Interviews 12 13
Total Participants 12 15
Of those:
Number of female participants 3 1
Number of male participants 9 14
Age 20–40 years 2 5
Age 40–60 years 5 6
Age 60–80 years 5 4
3. Theoretical Background
The academic debate on corruption has revolved around
whether to view it as a collective action problem or a
principal-agent problem, but recent theoretical work has
suggested the two approaches could be considered as
complementary (Marquette & Peiffer, 2019; Williams &
Le Billon, 2017). Persson, Rothstein, and Teorell (2018)
state that collective action theory could be complemen-
tary to principal-agent theory in cases where corruption
is not systemic and the problem of collective action has
been solved. The principal-agent approach then ensures
formal mechanisms of control, where corruption is de-
tected and those engaging in it are punished. The ap-
proach includes the utility maximization concept of cor-
ruption, which suggests that it results from rational be-
haviour in which individuals participate in corruption be-
cause the benefits outweigh the costs (Rose-Ackerman,
1978; Søreide, 2014). The expected benefits might con-
sist of monetary gains, power, and status, whereas the
costs can include bribe payments to hide the act, ef-
forts to hide the crime, moral costs of violating societal
rules and norms, and the perceived risk of getting caught
(Søreide, 2014). Collective action theory dictates that fol-
lowing this logic of perceived cost and benefit, individu-
als will base their decision, on whether to engage in cor-
ruption or not, on the perception of how likely it is that
other individuals are corrupt (Persson et al., 2018).
The pillars of an anti-corruption policy are increas-
ing transparency, strengthening enforcement, the pres-
ence of an anti-corruption agency, higher wages for
public officials, and efforts to change societal norms
(Fishman & Golden, 2017). These can also be catego-
rized as policies aiming at monitoring and incentive pro-
grams or those which intend to alter the rules of the
system, the latter category being less explored (Hanna,
Bishop, Nadel, Scheffler, & Durlacher, 2011). In line with
the utility-maximizing concept, successful corruption-
reduction strategies deter individuals from engaging in
corruption by making the cost outweigh the benefits
(Hanna et al., 2011).
According to Kolstad et al. (2008), corruption can oc-
curmore frequentlywithin resourcemanagementwhere
the capacity to enforce and monitor the sectors is low.
Additionally, the EU’s anti-corruption report (European
Commission, 2014) states that anti-corruption rules lack
enforcement since the relevant institutions have insuffi-
cient capacity and inadequate political will to tackle it.
The policies hinge upon political incentives and approval
as they can be undermined by a lack of political will.
Policy success in this area can be achieved when author-
ities responsible for enforcement are supported by high-
level political officials (Fishman & Golden, 2017).
4. Results
The empirical analysis of the interview data suggests
that the implementation and enforcement of legal frame-
works are vital factors when it comes to perceptions re-
garding corruption in the resource sectors. We found
Politics and Governance, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 2, Pages 167–179 169
that in both cases, institutions tasked with monitoring
and enforcing legislation were not provided with the ca-
pacity to carry out their role. This resulted in the percep-
tion of there being a suspicious relationship between pol-
itics and the businesses operating in the sectors.
4.1. Iceland’s Institutional Organization
The fisheries sector in Iceland has a positive international
image when it comes to the governance of natural re-
sources, as it is reputed for its sustainable fisheries man-
agement. However, even though the fishing quota sys-
tem is renowned for its efficiency, it is still the source of
a great deal of social and political debate in the country
(Chambers & Carothers, 2017; Kokorsch & Benediktsson,
2018). Icelandic fisheries management is mainly based
on two bodies of legislation which aim to improve man-
agement of marine resources to ensure that they will
be used sustainably, guaranteeing maximum long-term
output for the Icelandic nation (Icelandic Government,
1996, 2006). The laws stipulate that the public authori-
ties responsible for monitoring the fisheries sector are
the Directorate of Fisheries (DoF), which operates under
the Ministry of Industries, Tourism and Innovation. The
Icelandic Coast Guard protects the 200marine-mile zone
around Iceland from intruders and occasionally accompa-
nies the DoF tomonitor whether vessels operating out at
sea are doing so according to their permits.
4.1.1. The DoF
The role of the DoF is laid out in The DoF Act (Icelandic
Government, 1992). It is in charge of enforcing the
FisheriesManagement Acts, as well as administering and
monitoring fishing activities. A part of its role is to ac-
company fishermen on their fishing trips and to mon-
itor operations and observe whether the discarding of
catch is taking place. DoF also measures the size of fish
that are caught and send the data to the Marine and
Freshwater Research Institute, which then compares the
sizes to those of fish that are landed to seewhether there
is any discrepancy which would indicate that so-called
‘high-grading’ is taking place, meaning that fishermen
discard the smaller fish out at sea and only bring the big-
ger, more valuable ones to shore. During 2017, employ-
ees of DoF went on 306 such trips (The Icelandic DoF,
2017). As demonstrated in the interviews, each small
boat is surveyed 1–2 times per year while each large ves-
sel is surveyed bi-annually. 25 individuals within the DoF
perform these inspections (The Icelandic National Audit
Office [INAO], 2018).
4.2. Legislation Lacking Enforcement Mechanisms
A system introducing quotas into the fisheries sector
in Iceland was introduced in 1984, in an effort to re-
verse the trend of excessive overfishing (Danielsson,
1997). The legislation on fisheriesmanagement has been
amended ever since, and the changes scrutinized. In a
report by INAO (2018) on the DoF, it is clear that there
are several limitations to DoF operations. It states that
monitoring of the fisheries sector is extensive and diffi-
cult to carry out. Furthermore, surveillance of the fish
catch being weighed was deemed unsatisfactory, mean-
ing that there were opportunities for an individual or
a company to report lower catches than they actually
landed, indicating that more fish could have been caught
than ended up being reported. Additionally, the report
claimed that monitoring of catch discard was both weak
and unsystematic.
A majority of the Icelandic interviewees voiced con-
cerns over the lack of enforcement mechanisms avail-
able to the monitoring authorities. According to a cur-
rent/former staff member of the DoF, employees agreed
that the institution was not powerful:
You know the regulation…or the legal framework is
so weak. We can’t handle to, you know, close cases.
There is always something, and I even know of cases
where those that know someone in the Ministry [of
Fisheries], can just place a call to the Ministry and get
cases dismissed. (personal communication)
The individual further described that DoF monitoring
staff regularly encountered scepticism from small-boat
fishermen, since they believed the authorities focused
on smaller players with minor offences, rather than the
bigger vessels. Furthermore, when discussing enforce-
ment, a current/former academic stated:
And you need ways to actually say that, you know,
these are the rules, these are the people that are re-
sponsible for the rules, and then when the rules are
broken, this is what happens. I think, that is where
I think, in these later parts, where the system sort of
breaks down. (personal communication)
Actors have begun to expect that there will be no con-
sequences brought down upon those who cheat the
system. A current/former journalist claimed that those
working in the sector actually wanted the rules to be
clearer because the alternative to clear rules was chaos.
If the monitoring system was so easy to manipulate and
expected consequences for doing so were limited, peo-
ple who did follow the rules went through the follow-
ing thinking process: “This is a system that is easy to
cheat somehow. And then…then I, who am following the
rules, start to think:Why bother?Why don’t I just do this
too? Nobody does anything about it” (personal commu-
nication). In theory, law stipulating financial sanctions
against those catching fish above their legal limit pro-
vides the DoF with all kinds of power to act. In reality,
they lack the capacity to bring cases forward. By applying
system analysis we illustrate linkages between the lack of
enforcement and the risk of corruption, as identified in
our interviews (Figure 1).
Politics and Governance, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 2, Pages 167–179 170
Effort needed to
monitor the sector
+ +
+ +
+
– +
–
Rumours about
illegal acvity in
sector
Consequences expected
for engaging in illegal
acvity
Probability actors will
engage in illegal acvity
Enforcement of
legislaon
Illegal acvity in
sectorR1 R2
Actors perceiving
others are cheang the
system
Figure 1. A causal loop diagram representing the two reinforcing vicious cycles that drive illegal activity in the sector.
A causal loop diagram contains either reinforcing (R)
or balancing (B) loops. The arrow denotes the nature of
the interaction between two variables. If an arrow has
a plus sign, it means that an increase in the first vari-
able will lead to an increase for the second variable, or
a decrease will lead to a decrease. If it has a minus sign,
the change occurs in the opposite direction, an increase
will lead to a decrease or vice versa. When the loop con-
tains only plus signs, or the minus signs add up to an
even number, the loop is reinforcing; if not, it is balancing
(Sterman, 2000).
Two main reinforcing feedback loops increase the
risk of corruption in Figure 1, labelled R1 and R2. The
loops amplify behaviour, and in this case, the system
is trapped in a vicious cycle. Especially if no balancing
loops are present to counteract the behaviour, for exam-
ple through anti-corruption measures aimed at increas-
ing the perceived consequences of engaging in illegal ac-
tivity. When illegal activity takes place, more effort is
needed to monitor the sector. It takes less time and re-
sources to verify that individuals are working according
to the law,when they indeed are, thanwhen they engage
in illegal activity. Whenmore effort is needed to monitor
the sector, enforcement of legislation decreases. When
enforcement decreases, individuals expect fewer conse-
quences for engaging in illegal activity, which in return
increases illegal activity in the sector. As illegal activity
increases, more rumours spread about such illegal activ-
ity within the small community of fishermen. Those ru-
mours increase individual’s perceptions that others are
cheating the system, which will raise the probability of
them engaging in illegal activity as well. As highlighted
above, this ‘why bother’ mentality raises the probability
of illegal activity taking place, since the perceived bene-
fits might outweigh the costs, especially when accompa-
nied by low expectation of consequences.
4.3. Romania’s Institutional Organization
Romania is known for its extensive forests and is one of
themain timber producers in Europe. However, alarming
rates of illegal deforestation (Ministry of Environment,
Water, and Forest, 2019) have had a considerable impact
on the country’s ability to ensure sustainable forestry
management (Bouriaud & Marzano, 2016). The legisla-
tive act on the forestry resource in Romania is the Forest
Code which aims to regulate the sustainable manage-
ment of the forestry resources and provide forest re-
sources for the current and future needs of society
(Romanian Government, 2008). All forest is divided into
units, that are either privately or publicly owned. Each
forest unit needs to be administered by a forest district.
The National Forestry Administration, Romsilva, has his-
torically been in charge of the forest districts and op-
erates under the Ministry of Environment, Water, and
Forests (Romanian Government, 2009). Forest guards
are in charge of monitoring the forests.
4.3.1. Forest Administration
Romsilva, a state-owned enterprise, operates on the ba-
sis that it is financially autonomous (National Forestry
Authority Act, 2009). It has a dual role, but it is tasked
withmaximizing profits generated from forestry exploita-
tion, while at the same time being in charge of sus-
tainably administering all publicly owned and national
forests in Romania (Rosilva.ro, 2019; Volintiru, Trandafir,
Toma, Nutu, & Damian, 2017). After changes were made
to the Forest Code in 2008, all forest owners, public and
private, were obliged to ensure that their forests were
managed according to the law (Niţă, 2015). In order to
abide by that law, they needed to purchase forest admin-
istration services from either Romsilva or a private for-
est administration service. Those services include a for-
est management plan, usually valid for 10 years. Among
other issues, the plan specifies the harvesting volume
that is permitted andwhich tree species should be grown
(Bouriaud & Marzano, 2016). The Romanian public cur-
rently holds a poor perception of forest administration
since Romsilva has been affected by corruption scandals,
resulting in a negative portrayal of their activities in the
media (Palaghianu & Dutca, 2017; Volintiru et al., 2017).
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4.3.2. Forest Guards
The Forest guards are considered to be public officials as
they operate directly under theMinistry of Environment,
Water, and Forests. The country is separated into nine
different territories, with each territory having a head
forest guard in charge of the monitoring operations.
Romania is divided into 42 counties, so one forest guard
territory includes several counties. In total, there are
approximately 600 forest guards employed, in charge
of monitoring a forest area encompassing 6,5 million
hectares (Institutul National de Statistica, 2018). The role
of the forest guards was described in an interview with
a current/former individual working in private forest ad-
ministration as “everything” (personal communication).
They are responsible formonitoring the entire harvesting
phase, from verifying that management plans are done
according to the law to how the timber is transported on
public roads. The individual further stated:
The paymentmethod is problematic because you can-
not survive with a salary of a forest guard [approx.
400 EUR/month]. You cannot have that salary when
you guard a land that is so large and expensive. You
are responsible all year and all hours with this kind
of salary. The legislation is made like this in order for
politicians to have a certain amount of political capi-
tal in elections. The forest guard is responsible for ev-
erything that gets stolen from the forest while he has
1000 hectares to monitor. (personal communication)
Numerous interviewees voiced concerns over the capac-
ity of the forest guards to perform their role. According
to interviewees, salaries of forest guards used to be even
smaller and were raised in an effort to combat illegal log-
ging. The rationale was that if forest guards had higher
salaries, there would be less incentive for them to en-
gage in corruption and criminal activity. Additionally, a
measure was introduced, so that if timber disappeared
from the forest and the perpetrators not found, the for-
est guards would be held personally responsible for the
missing timber and have to pay a fine equal to themarket
value of that timber. Interviewees also raised the issue
that forest guards were vulnerable when going into the
field to monitor the forests and should, therefore, carry
a weapon. Indeed, as analysis of the data was ongoing in
2019, two forest guards in Romaniaweremurderedwhilst
carrying out their duties (McGrath, 2019). As a result,
working as a forest guard can be viewed as a high-risk oc-
cupation, and the lower chamber in the Romanian parlia-
ment recently approved legislation obliging forest guards
to carry a weapon on duty (“Decizie după crima,’’ 2019).
4.4. Legislation Lacking Legitimacy and Enforcement
The forestry sector faced substantial challenges follow-
ing the collapse of the communist regime in the coun-
try in 1989. A sector that had been state-owned needed
to be repossessed and given back to its former owners
and undergo extensive structural change (Palaghianu &
Dutca, 2017). In terms of the development of the forestry
legislation, it became apparent that the changes made
in 1996 resulted in a decrease in forest area due to the
lack of penal consequences for those who violated the
law (Niţă, 2015). Even though legislation has since been
amended, the country is still struggling to combat ille-
gal activity in the sector. A majority of the Romanian
interviewees brought up legislation in the forestry sec-
tor during the interviews. Concerns were raised over
how prescriptive and complicated the legislation was,
which made it difficult to understand and enforce. A cur-
rent/former Romsilva employee stated:
Romania used to have, before the change from the
communist regime, one of the best administrative for-
estmanagement systems in Europe. Very prescriptive,
very nice. We have very nice forests due to them. But
this system is no longer adapted to the nature of the
ownership nowadays. So, you cannot enforce it. You
will have a level, a high level of illegalities. Because
standards of the law are rather high up. (personal
communication)
Additional interviewees expressed that in their view, the
laws were outdated and unfair. The technical standard
specified in the legislation, as well as rules on species
composition and sampling density, were perceived as be-
ing outdated and imposed, as they needed to be brought
up to datewith themodern era. An individual with exten-
sive experience in the forestry sector explained that the
legal code “is not proper for our time” (personal commu-
nication) when discussing the technical standard in the
legislation, because forests were growing much faster
now due to a warming climate. Moreover, an intervie-
wee currently/formerly employed in the private forest
administration expressed the view that “our legislation
now starts from the idea that people steal and are cor-
rupt” (personal communication), which made the legis-
lation too prescriptive. The individual believed that the
legislation could be simpler if it emphasized the benefits
people could get from the sector, rather than solely lay-
ing out how people could be deterred from stealing from
the forest. Furthermore, forest owners were not satis-
fied with being obliged to buy forest administration ser-
vices and the prescriptive legislation did not allow them
the freedom tomakemanagement decisions about their
own forest. Theywanted to be free to set their own goals
for their forest, which aligns with what Palaghianu and
Dutca (2017) found in their work. In Figure 2, we show-
case the linkages between the lack of enforcement and
the risk of corruption.
As can be seen in Figure 2 loop R1, when there is
less enforcement of the legislation, people expect fewer
consequences for engaging in illegal activity. The fewer
consequences they expect, the more illegal activity will
take place in the sector, which means that more effort
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Figure 2. A causal loop diagram representing the two reinforcing loops that undermine enforcement of the forestry
legislation.
is needed to monitor it, which again decreases enforce-
ment. Loop R2 demonstrates that when enforcement de-
creases, the perceived legitimacy of laws and regulation
in the sector decreases, which increases the perception
that illegal activity is justifiable. When illegal activity is
increasingly seen as justified, it increases acceptance of
illegal activity as being socially normal, which again in-
creases the illegal activity in the sector. When illegal ac-
tivity increases, so does the effort needed to monitor it.
Once more effort is needed for monitoring, the capac-
ity to enforce the legislation goes down which translates
into less enforcement.
Even though there seems to be awareness amongst
stakeholders that monitoring of the sector is ineffective
due to low capacity of public officials, recent measures
such as increasing the wages of forest guards does not
appear to have resulted in improvements in enforce-
ment, as indicated by data on illegal logging (Ministry of
Environment, Water, and Forest, 2019).
4.5. Perceptions of Suspicious Relationships
In both the Iceland andRomania cases, interviewees held
perceptions that economically powerful actors in the sec-
tors had the ability to use their financial power to influ-
ence the political sphere. Monitoring authorities were
weak due to the fact that the line between business and
politics was thin. As described by a current/former mem-
ber of the Icelandic parliament:
It has…given up on being a monitoring system. Like
it should be. And instead operates within the bound-
aries that the interest groups decide. Set them, you
know. Of course, they observe and intervene, but,
but…certain things they leave out. And they know,
that if they go to [name of a big company] and un-
cover wrong weighing [of fish] that then they are just
up against someone that is out of their reach. Because
fishing company owners are so powerful, they bypass
monitoring authorities. Bypass the DoF and just go
to the Ministry. Into the political parties. (personal
communication)
A similar view was held by a current/former public offi-
cial who stated that “the big fishing quota owners con-
trol what goes into the legislation” (personal communica-
tion). A former/current academic further stated: “In my
opinion interest groups have too much influence and
politicians are their puppets” (personal communication).
Similar perceptions were found in Romania, as can be
seen in this comment from a current/former journalist:
Regarding the partnership between the industry and
Romsilva for example, and the Romanian state. I’ll put
it thisway: Because in somany cases the corrupt politi-
cians use corrupt businessmen, for their profit or fi-
nancial profit. Or from the political perspective, in so
many cases, the election campaigns, every four years,
they were funded with illegal money coming from ille-
gal logging. (personal communication)
A current/former forest owner further explained in an
interview “Because every government sees Romsilva as
a… cow with milk.” It appears that managing the state-
owned enterprise has been seen by many as an opportu-
nity to obtain wealth, since many former directors with
strong political ties to the country’s ruling party, Partidul
Social Democrat (PSD), have been implicated in corrup-
tion scandals (Volintiru et al., 2017). Furthermore, dur-
ing an interview with an individual with extensive experi-
ence having served multiple roles in the sector, the indi-
vidual stated:
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And nobody wants to go to…in the forest to cut,
to make some services and contracts with Romsilva.
Because everybody knowswhat’s going on. They have
some problems. But…why? Because the political man-
agement, the political management are allowing ille-
gal cutting. Illegal volumes. Illegal money. They are ac-
tually looking for illegal money. That’s the problem.
(personal communication)
Effective resource management is dependent on rules
to be regarded as legitimate and fair by those operat-
ing in the sector. When perceptions of suspicious rela-
tionships between businesses and politicians are preva-
lent, it increases the risk of corruption in the value chain
as it undermines anti-corruption efforts. It is therefore
important that such actions are directed towards foster-
ing collective action, and not solely designed through a
principal-agent approach (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2013).
4.6. Corruption Risks in the Value Chains
An overview of the corruption risks identified by re-
spondents is demonstrated in Table 2. There we take
the resource value chain from legislation to harvest-
ing, monitoring and revenue management, and point to
which corruption risks were identified by interviewees at
each step.
In both cases, we see similarities in the corruption
risks throughout the value chains, even though the sec-
tors in question are different due to the nature of the
resource. However, Iceland and Romania have tackled
these risks in different ways.
4.7. Anti-Corruption Policies
Both countries are subject to having their anti-corruption
efforts evaluated by GRECO. The main issues in Iceland
relate to conflicts of interests, as the management
of public affairs is excessively intermingled with pri-
vate interests. Lobbyism by third parties to influence
government work and revolving doors go unregulated
(GRECO, 2018a). Romania’s progress towards combat-
ting corruption is closely monitored by the EU (European
Commission, 2019). Issues and occasions where parlia-
mentarians, judges, and prosecutors have misused their
power and functions for personal gain come up regularly
and prosecutions of such actions have been ineffective
(GRECO, 2018b). Regarding illegal logging specifically, the
European Commission sent the country a letter of for-
mal notice urging action in February of 2020 (European
Commission, 2020).
4.7.1. Iceland’s Efforts to Increase Transparency
The policies Iceland has adopted in order to address
corruption risks within the fisheries sector have mainly
been based on monitoring and incentives procedures
through increased transparency. However, according to
Bauhr and Grimes (2017), accountability is not necessar-
ily increased by transparency, as access to information
does not guarantee answerability and sanctioning, and
more research is needed to understand the conditions
under which increasing transparency will reduce corrup-
tion risks.
According to Suuronen and Gilman (2019), at-sea
observer programs are the most effective monitoring
schemes available today, but with recent technolog-
ical advances, remote electronic monitoring has be-
come increasingly feasible. Remote electronic monitor-
ing does have limitations, but complimenting it with
human observers could increase transparency in fish-
eries management (Ewell, Hocevar, Mitchell, Snowden,
& Jacquet, 2020). Interviewees expressed satisfaction
with the GPS tracking system,whereas according to a cur-
rent/former academic:
Any activities out at sea, so if they are illegally fishing
somewhere, that is actually reallywell knownbecause
they have GPS. And if they are getting close to an area
they shouldn’t be fishing, there is real-time monitor-
ing of that. (personal communication)
Transparency in fish pricing and catch numbers was
brought up in interviews, as those numbers were eas-
Table 2. Corruption risks identified within the sectors.
Romania Resource value chain Iceland
Legislation too complicated and outdated Legislation/regulations Legislation lacking enforcement mechanisms
Underestimations in forest management Harvesting operations Underestimations of fish weight
plans
Illegal logging Discarding and high grading
Forest guards do not have capacity to Monitoring of operations DoF does not have capacity to perform
monitor the area they are assigned their legal duties
Revenues generated in sector used to gain Revenue management Revenues generated in sector used to gain
political influence political influence
Source: The analytic framework is adapted from Alba (2009).
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ily accessible online. However, concerns also harmonized
with observations from the INAO (2018) report, that
even though catch numbers were available, the identi-
fied corruption risks related to the weighing of catch
and discard levels put those numbers under scrutiny.
A current/former public official, for example, stated that
“nobody knows how much of the resource is being ex-
ploited” (personal communication). The INAO (2018) rec-
ommended that the sector should take up electronic
monitoring by installing cameras on board as well as
introduce whistleblowing protection measures for fish-
ermen coming forward with accusations of discard-
ing. Those measures aim to reduce corruption risks in
the harvesting operations and monitoring parts of the
value chain.
4.7.2. Romania’s Application Inspectorul Padurii
(Forest Inspector)
According to Meehan and Tacconi (2017), the most com-
pelling reduction in deforestation is brought about by
efforts to reduce the risk of corruption throughout all
stages of forest management. Anti-corruption resolu-
tions through rule-changing interventions are less com-
mon than those focusing on incentives and monitoring
programmes and include the use of technology to by-
pass bureaucratic procedures, as in the Romanian case
(Hanna et al., 2011). Once asked about what had been
done to increase trust in the sector, most interviewees
mentioned an application set up by the government
which ordinary citizens could download to their mobile
phones. Using the application, they could take pictures
of licence plates of trucks carrying logs, which could in-
form them whether that truck was authorized to be driv-
ing on that particular road at that time. A current/former
academic stated:
Of course when you are more open and…you are, you
show what you are doing you get more trust. For ex-
ample, the authorities doing this system that every-
body can check the illegal logging, you know, you get
more trust of this…of this ministry or politicians and
so on. (personal communication)
It was seen as a good public policy instrument that
the general public could use to report on suspected
illegal activity. However, amongst the interviewees,
there seemed to be confusion whether the applica-
tion had been discontinued or not. An individual cur-
rently/formerly working for an NGO in Romania stated:
“I just know that people were angry that they had this op-
portunity to actually send official information to the au-
thorities and then it was just, it was just scrapped” (per-
sonal communication). The same individual expressed
fears that the level of reporting of illegal logging was
down “because if people see that the state doesn’t even
want to know, then why should you report it?” (personal
communication). A majority of interviewees were under
the impression that the app had been discontinued for
political reasons. However, according to a media inter-
view with the CEO of the IT company that developed
the app, it is still functional, but it needed improvements
and updates which the company developed and made
ready for release in 2017. The PSD government, however,
blocked the update (Savaliuc, 2020).
5. Discussion
In both of the cases in question, comprehensive legis-
lation regarding resource management had been put in
place. However, a lack of enforcement meant that the
monitoring authorities were perceived of as weak and
illegal activity was believed to go largely unpunished.
When monitoring authorities in both countries failed to
comply with their role due to lack of capacity or re-
sources, those operating in the sector become aware,
which influences how anti-corruption policy measures
play out. The resource governance systems can become
stuck in a vicious cycle, as described and discussed for
both fisheries in Iceland and forestry in Romania. Less ca-
pacity to enforce legislation leads to the perception that
the consequences of illegal activity are minor, which can
further amplify illegal activity in the sectors. Additionally,
results indicate thatmore resources are being taken than
reported through underestimations in forest manage-
ment plans and under-reporting of fish weights. In such
instances, the countries are missing out on royalties and
tax revenues.
The underlying assumption going into the case stud-
ies was that less corrupt countries were better able to
address corruption risks in their resource value chains.
Similar risks were identified in both resource sectors but
the countries have opted for different anti-corruption
mechanisms to limit them. Even though Romania does
have more serious challenges when it comes to fighting
corruption, it was unexpected to find that in both cases,
anti-corruptionmeasureswere being undermined by the
perceptions of there being suspicious relationships be-
tween public power and private interests. This highlights
that international indexes ranking countries’ perceived
corruption levels, such as the Corruption Perceptions
Index, are not well suited to inform policymakers on
the need for anti-corruption measures in specific sectors
or contexts.
These findings suggest that when there is a preva-
lent perception that governments have allowed moni-
toring institutions to become weak, due to lack of po-
litical will, it increases corruption risk in the resource
sector, which impedes sustainable management of nat-
ural resources. Addressing these risks through a frame-
work that sees the collective action approach and the
principal-agent approach as complementary would be
beneficial since elements of both have been identified
in this context. Furthermore, results from this study in-
dicate that when anti-corruption policies are not accom-
panied by sufficient enforcement and political will, the
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probability of their success is reduced, which agrees with
the findings of a recent report on corruption within the
fisheries sector by the United Nations Office on Drugs
and Crime (2019).
Vulnerabilities in Iceland due to conflicts of interests
and instances of misuse of power for personal gain in
Romania, as brought up by GRECO, appear to have wider
relevance. The implications being that weaknesses in na-
tional anti-corruption policies can translate into inade-
quate corruption reduction measures in specific sectors,
which this study has shown is the case in countries with
both high and low levels of corruption. Questions that
arose during the research process related to how suffi-
cient political will could be generated for strengthening
national anti-corruption policies, and how governments
could convince the public of their merits as well as their
policies, given that perceptions are not easily changed.
Based on this work, we recommend that policymeasures
should aim to build the institutional capacity needed to
enforce the comprehensive legal frameworks already in
place, which would show the public that there really was
a political will to tackle such issues.
6. Conclusion
In this study, we demonstrate mechanisms by which cor-
ruption risks are generated throughout resource value
chains. Vicious cycles were identified in both cases,
where less capacity to enforce the legislation leads to
the perception that the consequences of illegal activ-
ity were minor. That further amplified illegal activity in
the sectors, resulting in more effort being needed for
monitoring, and subsequently, less capacity of authori-
ties to enforce the legislation. A widespread perception
was also found among interviewees of there being a sus-
picious relationship between politics and big companies
licensed by the authorities to harvest and process nat-
ural resources. That perception seemed to be shaped
by the inability of monitoring authorities to carry out
their role. The processes we have described weaken anti-
corruption efforts in the sectors and impede sustainable
resource management since it can lead to more of the
resources being exploited than officially reported. Even
thoughour results point tomechanisms that increase the
risk of corruption by undermining enforcement of legisla-
tion, we propose that our findings could be strengthened
if the analysis were applied to further cases.
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